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ABSTRACT Access control is fundamental and prerequisite to govern and safeguard information assets within an 
organisation. Organisations generally use web enabled remote access coupled with applications access distributed on the 
various networks facing various challenges including increase operation burden, monitoring issues due to the dynamic and 
complex nature of security policies for access control.  The increasingly dynamic nature of collaborations means that in one 
context a user should have access to sensitive information and not applicable for another context. The current access control 
models are static and lack of Dynamic Segregation of Duties (SoD), Task instance level of Segregation and decision making 
in real time. This paper addresses the limitations and supports access management in borderless network environment with 
dynamic SoD capability at real time access control decision making and policy enforcement. This research makes three 
contributions: i) Defining an Authorising Workflow Task Role Based Access Control using the existing task and workflow 
concepts. It integrates the dynamic SoD considering the task instance restriction to ensure overall access governance and 
accountability. It enhances the existing access control models such as RBAC by dynamically granting users access right and 
providing Access governance. ii) Extended the OASIS standard of XACML policy language to support the dynamic access 
control requirements and enforce the access control rules for real time decision making to mitigate risk relating to access 
control such as escalation of privilege in broken access control and insufficient logging and monitoring  iii) The model is 
implemented using open source Balana policy engine to demonstrate its applicability to a real industrial use case from a 
financial institution. The results show that, AW-TRBAC is scalable consuming relatively large number of complex request 
and able to meet the requirements of dynamic access control characteristics. 
 
INDEX TERMS: Identity and Access Management, Role Based Access Control, eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language, Attribute Access Control, Dynamic segregation of duties
I. INTRODUCTION 
Identity and access management (IAM) is a framework for 
business processes that facilitates the management of 
legitimate user identity and access control of business 
sensitive assets. The term access control refers to an 
organisation's policy for authorising process for access, the 
mechanisms provides and enforces the policy and the 
model which on the policy and process is based on. There 
are two fundamental types of access control; Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC). While initial research and applications addressed 
preventing the unauthorized access to the classified 
information, recent applications have applied these policies 
to commercial environment (O’Connor et.al, 2010). Other 
research considered the approaches on the decentralised 
granular level of entitlements such as; Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) (Rajpoot. et. al, 2015), Attribute Based 
Access Control (ABAC) (Biswas and Sandhu, 2016), 
XACML (Oasis,2010), and Risk Adaptive Access Control 
(RAdAC) (Farroha and Farroha, 2012). Organisations are 
now dynamically changing roles to the users or revoke any 
existing role due to the various business demands. There 
are many applications that are running from an outsourced 
environment such as cloud or from supply chain partners, 
which needs to deal access control dynamically comparable 
to the traditional in-house application.  Despite of the 
significant development, there is a lack of focus of the 
existing access control models for granting access, 
enforcing dynamic SoD (Segregation of Duties) (Ma, et.al, 
2011), BoD (Binding of Duties) and   access governance 
through workflow management (Crampton, 2004). 
The novel contributions of this research are: Firstly, a 
dynamic access control model, i.e.,  Authorising Workflow 
Task Role-Based Access Control (AW-TRBAC) , is 
proposed that  uses dynamic segregation of duties (SoD) 
and process workflow and considers the task instance 
restrictions for the roles restriction, access governance and 
logs (Compliance). The approach uses the existing task and 
workflow concepts to build identity and access 
management solutions.  Therefore, this research enhances 
the existing access control models such as RBAC and 
ABAC by dynamically granting users access right to 
promote access governance and risk mitigation. Secondly, 
this work extends the OASIS standard of XACML for 
developing a dynamic access control policy language so 
that it can enforce the access control rules and additional 
functionalities to enforce SoD at the task instance, 
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remediating broken access control risk (OWASP,2019). 
Through the logging of instance task events, it enhances 
access governance to provide visibility of unmanaged data. 
Finally, the model is implemented using the open-source 
Balana policy engine (Chen and Gasparini,2013) to 
demonstrate its applicability using an industrial use case of 
a financial institution to test the performance and alleviate 
the risk of escalation of privilege and data disclosure. The 
test results show that, AW-TRBAC does not impact on 
overall system performance despite of changing user access 
request dynamically and mitigate the risk of escalation of 
privilege to prevent data disclosure.   
II.RELATED WORK  
There exists several widely used access control models, 
however, wide adoption of these models remains a 
challenge.  This section presents the existing access control 
models and works that focused on the identity and access 
control management. 
 
A.ACCESS CONTROL MODEL  
RBAC is a framework using roles to control access to 
resources, permissions are grouped into a role, a role will 
have several members and will have set of defined granular 
level of credentials (Fenstein and Youman,1996). The 
RBAC model achieves the two principles of Security 
systems “Least Privilege “and “Segregation of Duties”. In 
recent years, a considerable amount of work has been done 
on the use of RBAC to support access control in workflow 
systems (Wainer and Barthelmess, 2003). However, role-
based access control has its own set of limitations such as 
role explosion and role-permission explosion (Rajpoot. et. 
al, 2015). Termination of the role which has not been 
defined in the NIST standard for RBAC, this feature has not 
been defined in any authorisation model, if a user 
terminated (revoked) what happens to their session, which 
has been activated through role, should the role be 
terminated instantly or retained for a period before 
terminating it (deleting it) (Thomas and Sandhu, 1997). The 
TBAC is lacking from rules for revoking of user sessions 
immediately and retaining the session active for a period 
while disabling the account for audit purposes when 
requested . 
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) have no consensus 
model up to date (O’Connor et.al, 2010), the concept is that 
users and resources have attributes known about them, 
either through situational data, such time of the day, person 
logged on to the network, or the user data such as title or 
location.  ABAC is  more flexible than RBAC because it 
does not require separate roles for relevant sets of subject 
attributes, and rules can be implemented quickly to 
accommodate changing needs. Disadvantages are, on the 
other hand, that access control policy might become more 
dynamic than preferable for audit and attestation, it requires 
many rules which makes the analysis difficult (Wang, 
et.al,2004).  The user entitlement access report is difficult 
to retrieve as the access is based on attributes rather than 
entitlements. ABAC (Hu and Kuhn, 2015) has been around 
for over two decades and numerous models (Biswas and 
Sandhu,2016) have been proposed. . Despite the existence 
of these different ABAC models, there is no consensus on a 
specific standard ABAC model (O’Connor et.al, 2010) 
Recently,  multiple  dynamic attributes such as application 
usage and unlock failure  is considered for ensuring access 
control and data confidentiality of  mobile cloud 
environment (Neah and Shashikala,2019). The model needs 
preinstallation in the hand set to capture the attributes and 
addresses mobile authentication adversary. The results 
show an efficient  uninterrupted communication between 
the users and the cloud storage server. Three factors 
authentication scheme is proposed by (Jolfaei  et al ,2019)  
for wireless sensor networks.  Formal and informal security 
analysis is done of proposed protocol using known and 
unknown attacks such as stolen smart card attack and 
privileged insider attack.  The result shows that the 
approach is more secure and efficient than the existing 
schemes.  
XACML is based upon XML and was developed to specify 
access control policies in a machine-readable format (Oasis, 
2010). Policy creation can be complicated and the use of 
XACML does not necessarily make the task of creating, 
specifying, and enforcing good access control policy any 
less difficult. There is also a need to ensure that the entire 
enterprise uses the same attributes for access, and that all 
the attributes are from an authoritative source. In simple 
terms, an Authoritative Attribute Source (AAS), policies 
should be able to specify which sources of attributes are 
authoritative for the policy, and there should be 
mechanisms to verify that the attributes provided by a 
requester come from the AAS. According to (Ma, et.al, 
2011) policy-based workflow management (PBWF), which 
entails policies based on the business processes, including 
access control, authorisation and authentication. Authors 
have used the notation of TBAC and RBAC   to depict the 
flow of information and shown both dynamic and static 
access control needed in a workflow. However, there are 
various authorisation policies within the organisation which 
has not been studied.  Furthermore, there is also a lack of 
focus on resolving conflicts among the different authorizing 
policies within the access control models. 
  
B. ACCESS CONTROL ADVERSARIES  
There are works that focus on the vulnerabilities and risks 
of existing access control model.  A survey results from 
(OWASP, 2017) mentioned two critical access control 
risks. i.e., Insufficient Logging and monitoring and broken 
access control.  The design of the adversary is based on the 
established STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of 
privilege) and DREAD(Damage, Reproducibility, 
Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) 
exploitability model to determine the likelihood of 
adversary(Do et.al, 2019). Typically, the goal of the 
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adversary is to disrupt or prevent proper operation of a 
secure system.  Exploitation of insufficient logging and 
monitoring is the bedrock of nearly every major incident. 
Improper or absence of proper logging of events, failed 
logins transactional logs allows attackers to further attack 
systems, maintain persistence, pivot to more systems, and 
tamper, extract, or destroy data. Broken access control 
confers to restrictions on what authenticated users are 
allowed to do which are often not properly enforced, risk 
associated with this is attackers can exploit these flaws to 
access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as 
access other users' accounts, view sensitive files, modify 
other users’ data, change access rights, etc.  Exploitability 
occurs when the attacker changes the parameter value, 
which directly refers to a system object for which he is 
unauthorized through applications and APIs where all the 
user request privileges are not verified resulting in Privilege 
escalation.  Another research on the risk Adaptive access 
control (RAdAC) uses the information from the 
environmental condition and risk level, it combines 
information about a subject machine, corporate IT 
infrastructure, environmental risk factors for the decision 
making process (Farroha and Farroha, 2012). An advantage 
of this approach is if the policy allows then it can override 
the decision in a situation where necessary, for example, in 
a high security it will   enforce dual authentication and in a 
relaxed secure it will make a decision based on the digital 
policy. However, we have also observed limitation of this 
work , specifically similar to PBAC,  it relies on digital 
policies. If the policy is ambiguous, then it could result 
towards possible security breach.   
All these works above are important and contributed 
towards the improvement of identify and access 
management. However, it has been observed several 
limitations within the Dynamic SoD, BoD and access 
governance and risk mitigation.  This research contributes 
to bring all silo components into a whole novel access 
control to fill the gaps of Dynamic Role Change, SoD, 
BoD, governance and policy compliance to improve risk 
posture 
III.AN INDUSTRIAL USE CASE AND LIMITATIONS 
As mentioned before this research is based on an industrial 
use case which is presented briefly by this section. The use 
case is about an investment bank located in London. Due to 
the confidential reason, identity of this institution will not 
be disclosed and only use the non-confidential information 
about the business as running example to demonstrate our 
approach. The organisation has asset over trillion dollars 
and located in 17 locations worldwide.  It is a privately held 
financial institution and has been a leader and a solution 
provider for over 200 years.  The company is expert in 
Corporate Banking, Merger & Acquisition advisory, 
Investment Management, and wealth management and 
investor services. 
 
Access Provisioning process triggered by the security 
coordinator it is then “Security Administrators” who close 
the Access request after access has been provisioned this 
enables segregation of duties (SoD). There is additional 
level of SoD between the roles “Security Coordinator” and 
“Security Request Approver” security Coordinator cannot 
be the “approver”.  However, there are certain cases where 
the approver of one workflow is the submitter of another 
and it is not possible to enforce this restriction based on a 
request.  
  
Figure 1: Current Access Management Lifecycle changes made to the diagram 
The access control workflow process for high security 
environment of this Investment Bank would be submitted 
via Coordinator into a security request database, which will 
then send notification to the approving manager for 
approval.  The request will reach the Information Security 
Department to be actioned (Fig1). Challenges are number 
of different silos authorisation systems operating 
independently, lacking in governance and user access 
reconciliation. The organisational security policies and 
rules of “least privilege” and “separation of Duties (SOD)” 
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to minimise fraud and error becomes onerous. role level 
restriction, it requires restriction within task level which is 
referred to as “instance level restriction”. 
In a more dynamic process where role transfer or 
departmental transfer, two levels of approval required, 
approval from manager of the transferring department as 
well as the approval from the manager the user is 
transferring to.  It is essential to enforce that the 1st 
approver approves the requests before the 2nd approver; 
sequence of tasks needs to be maintained.  The old 
credential needs to be revoked before granting new 
credentials. Hence, the organisation is facing various 
challenges for the overall access control management.   
• There is a lack of dynamic access control to 
accommodate the diverse hosting of information. This 
could also impose the escalation of privilege risk 
• By passing vetting process, no visibility of data access 
due to inadequate business process workflow. 
• Lack of visibility and access control governance due to 
inadequate access control policy verification and 
limited support for centralized identity repository 
• Processes are manual, cumbersome and  inconsistent 
between business units due to missing  streamlined 
access management process  across business.  This 
makes the  governance of Access Management 
becomes cumbersome as multiple silos systems is 
resort to for validations. 
IV.THE PROPOSED AW-TRBAC 
The proposed Authorising Workflow Task Role Based 
Access Control (AW-TRBAC) model considers granting 
users access rights through role change in a dynamic 
context. The proposed model consists of several 
components such as requirements, conceptual view, policy 
language, and Proof of Concepts (PoC). These components 
support to present the AW-TRBAC in detailed and 
presented in this section. 
 
A.REQUIREMENTS  
From the analysis of the Use Case as stated before and the 
review of the existing access control models: RBAC 
(Fenstein and Youman,1996) and ABAC (Biswas and 
Sandhu, 2016), a set of characteristics and specification 
derived for the functional requirements of the Dynamic 
Access Control Model.   We have considered a list of 
requirements which are necessary to support the 
characteristics of  emphasis dynamic segregation of duties 
and access governance.  
• Requirement 1:  Access request shall only be submitted 
by the role “Security Coordinator”.  
• Requirement 2:  Authorised Business Process Owner 
should approve the Security request 
• Requirement 3: Only Authorised users shall be 
permitted access to resources.  
• Requirement 4: User Access to be revoked after 
termination of service and service change.  
• Requirement 5: Service transfer through role change 
requires two level of Process Owner approvals 
(departing Service and Onboarding) and revocation of 
existing and provisioning on new credentials.  
• Requirement 6: Sufficient logging of events to be 
retained and monitored. 
Requirements 1,2,3 have been addressed in various access 
control models independently, (Ferraiolo and Sandhu, 
2001), which is very relevant, well-known and most used in 
the security area. There are many variations of constraints 
of SoD, despite various research, it imposes challenge in 
dynamic environment. The focus in this paper is 
Requirements 4,5, and 6, which are unique functional 
requirements for the Dynamic access control model to meet 
dynamic borderless network environment. Requirement 5 
which is role change, it has tasked constraints of SoD, BoD, 
revocation of access, this is an integral requirement which 
has dependencies on the functionality with other 
requirements. This paper focuses on the Role Change 
process and associated dependencies with the other 
processes. 
B.CONCEPTUAL VIEWS  
The second component of the model is the concepts 
necessary to define the AW-TRBAC. It is based on the 
existing identity and access control concepts such as user, 
Role, Permission and considers new concepts such as Task, 
IT Workflow. 
User: Users are the subjects of an access control, they 
execute their job function to achieve the company’s goal. 
They produce business information and this information is 
stored for future business activities. They may use 
information resources that were created by other 
employees. 
Task: The concept, task is a fundamental unit of business 
work or business activity. ‘Job function’ is another 
expression of task. Tasks are assigned to users by their job 
positions or business roles. At the access control’s point of 
view, users read or write information objects when 
executing their tasks. Access rights are required only for 
executing the assigned tasks. For Example, ‘Material 
resource planning’, ‘check issuing’, ‘purchase approval’, 
and ‘sales decision’, are examples of tasks. Tasks are 
assigned to users by their job positions or business roles 
Workflow: is an IT term of business process. In general, it 
means a product or method for supporting business process 
in the enterprise environment. The task ‘approve customer 
orders’ belongs to receiving customer order process. 
Executing tasks in the business process should submit to a 
defined process order and available time. Although task 
‘approve customer orders’ is assigned to the user, can 
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activate their access rights when the prior tasks ‘check 
customer credit’ and ‘check product stock’ are completed. 
In this case, authorization (access right assignment) is 
separated from activation of access rights. This case of 
access control is called active access control 
Resources: Information resources are the objects of access 
control, such as files, tables in a database, executable 
programs, etc. Information resources contain business 
information and support to execute the task within 
workflow resource that can be tangible and intangible.   
Business Process: Is a collection of linked tasks which find 
their end in the delivery of a service or product to a client. 
A business process has also been defined as a set of 
activities and tasks that, once completed, will accomplish 
an organizational goal.  A business process is an access 
control management in Information security function. 
Execution List:  An execution list is for all users who 
performed certain task instance, this will contain name, role 
and task that has been performed by a user.  It lists 
transaction logs of an event that has been auctioned by 
certain user, which is used in incidence response root cause 
analysis and compliance.  This is a critical control within 
information security for data analytics as well. 
Figure 2 shows class model of AW-TRBAC, it shows the 
class user, which has a direct association link to Business 
Process class, as a user belongs to a business process.  Role 
class has a composition relationship with the Task class, a 
role may have many tasks associated with it.   Workflow is 
another class that has three generalised (association) 
classes Termination, Role Change and Emergency 
Password (privileged account).  Workflow can have 
termination request, role change request and Emergency 
Password request, each of the request has a task.   An 
activation class has inheritance association with Task class 
and association link with Task instance class, the task is 
only activated if the condition is met with the task.  
Execution list class has inheritance relationship with the 
Task Instance ID class by obtaining the list of executioners 
from the execution task class for historical information
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Figure 2: Conceptual view of the AW-TRBAC access control Model   
C.EXTENSION OF XACML STANDARD 
As stated previously, this research extends the XACML 
standard to support the implementation of the dynamic 
access control, to meet the Use Case requirements and 
enforce the rules of the dynamic access control model 
through policy language.  XACML support the notation of 
the proposed dynamic access control model, such as Role, 
Task, Operation, so that it can act as policy enforcement, 
which interact with the access control model to make 
decisions. The focal point of this research is on dynamic 
Role Change, SoD, BoD functional and security 
requirements to enhance the risk posture and visibility.  To 
satisfy the use case requirements, five new functions and 
two new data stores has been introduced, which are utilised 
by the XACML policy engine in the decision making.  
These extended functions enable dynamic access control 
model to provide real time history-based instance-level 
segregation to mitigate the risks of broken access control 
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and insufficient logging events.  XACML is an OASIS 
standard that defines a general purpose access control and 
authorisation system (Oasis,2010). It consists of a policy 
language based on XML and a processing system that 
knows how to interpret the policy with respect to the 
relevant application. The policy language is used to create 
policies where each policy enlists the requirements to 
access a resource in a protected environment.  
 
Figure 3: XACML Standard (Oasis, 2010) 
As shown in the Fig 3 above, the major components of 
XACML Standard are;  
Policy Administration Point (PAP), which handles creating 
and managing all policies.  Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP), which handles intercepting users’ requests and 
enforcing XACML decisions received from the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP).  Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
handles evaluating users’ requests based on the existing 
policies and return XACML decisions to the PEP.  Finally, 
Policy Information Point (PIP) facilitates gathering 
additional attributes of a user.  
AW-TRBAC model extends the existing RBAC-XACML 
oasis standard by introducing two new Repository called 
Role Change store and Role Assigned Task store and five 
new functions: SoD check, BoD check, Role Check, Role 
Change check and Role change approve checks (coloured 
in blue Fig 4 below).  Each function is utilised for the 
different security request, for example SoD Check function 
will be utilised for requests that require segregation of duty 
constraints on submitter and approver role, it contain 
conditional obligations to enforce policy rules.  
As shown in Fig 4 below, Context handler is responsible for 
translating the received requests into the XACML context 
and the reverting results back to the native language of the 
system and communicating between the other components. 
In XACML the PDP (Policy Decision Point) handles   
decisions making of the authorisation requests based on the 
policy sets. With RBAC-XACML standard (Oasis,2010) 
there has been a new type of request that deals with role 
activation, it is decided that role activation should be out of 
the scope of PDP. For this reason, the Role Enablement 
Authority (REA) is introduced as a specialised repository 
containing a policy store in the decision making for role 
activation. The purpose of REA is to show existing 
XACML-RBAC oasis standard architecture.  AW-TRBAC 
has introduced a new type of request, to perform a 
workflow task. To deal with such request, this research 
extended the XACML OASIS standard with five new 
functions: SoD check, BoD check, Role Check, Role 
Change check and Role change approve checks, Lastly, the 
PDP functionalities are extended by using Context Handler 
to query the additional functions and  data store; Role 
Change store and Role Assigned Task store, to forward the 
request to the PDP for decision making.   
 D.XACML POLICY REQUESTS  
This section describes attributes in an XACML policy 
request, XACML policy has been defined to meet the use 
case policy requirements as part of the XACML extension, 
as shown below in Figure 5.  Access to resource request 
sent to the policy engine to be authorized by one or more 
policies, such requests need to be composed in a structured 
way that can be utilised by the policy execution engine. A 
policy request is divided into three parts: subject, resource 
and action.  A subject is defined as the user (request 
originated from), is implemented using XACML as User. 
Objects are expressed using XACML Resources such as 
files, web services. Operations are expressed using 
XACML as Actions.   Permission is the ability or right to 
perform some action on some resource, possibly only under 
certain specified conditions.  The term “attribute” refers to 
an XACML <attributes>, is an element in an XACML 
request having among its components an attribute name, 
identifier, a data type identifier, and an attribute value. Each 
is associated either with one of the subjects (Subject 
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Attribute), the protected resource (Resource Attribute), the 
action to be taken to the resource (Action Attribute), or the 
environment of the Request (Environmental Attribute). 
Illustrated below is an xacml policy to enforce SoD in AW-
TRBAC. 
<Request 
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" 
Combined Decision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false"> 
  <!--  Task  --> 
  <Attributes Category="urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:task-
category:access-task"> 
    <Attribute 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:task:task-id" 
IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">sec
urity-request-approve</AttributeValue> 
      </Attribute>      </Attributes> 
  <!--  User --> 
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-
category:access-subject"> 
    <Attribute 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" 
IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">ma
t</AttributeValue> 
      </Attribute> 
    </Attribute <!--  Policy to match --> 
    <Attributes  
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-
category:environment"> 
      <Attribute 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:envir
onment-id"IncludeInResult="false"> 
         <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">SE
G002</AttributeValue> 
         </Attribute>    
      </Attributes> 
  <!--  Task instance reference --> 
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-
category:access-resource"> 
    <Attribute 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-
id" IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">tif
917803b</AttributeValue> 
      </Attribute> 
   </Attributes> 
</Request> 
 
Figure 5: AW-TRBAC SoD Xacml Request for SoD 
V. DESIGN & ARCHITECTURE OF AW-
TRBAC 
This section presents the architecture and design of the 
Proof of Concept (POC). It also provides a high-level 
overview of the implementation of the solution, and its 
integration with the existing access management policies 
within the use case. XACML-based policy language has 
been considered to support requirements as policies to 
validate on IT workflow task and APIs to integrate the AW-
TRBAC model with WSO2 product (balana Open Source) 
service, to facilitate the additional functionality capabilities, 
dynamic SoD and IR (instance level Restriction), which 
currently not supported by Balana Engine. 
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Figure 4: Extended XACML Standard 
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In this research approach, the web portal is the main 
gateway to the AW-TRBAC, (as shown in Figure 6 high 
level architecture of the AW-TRBAC model), use REST 
API request, which is then processed by extracting various 
information from the security request into an XACML 
equivalent request. The next component is the 
Authorisation to access secured resource/service.  User 
identity will be verified against the XACML policies and 
executed in the AW-TRBAC engines (extended XACML 
engine) leveraging data store, task services and policy 
stores to provide correct permission required for the roles, 
decision is then passed on to the PEP module to direct to 
the user. This allows the authorised user to access to 
resources with appropriate permissions. 
 
The web portal is the initial point a service, in invoking 
various authorization requests.  The invocation is done 
through a series of REST calls.  There is a total of three 
REST URI’s implemented for the portal: Role_Change, 
SOD and BOD.  For the illustration purpose in this 
research, the first operations of Role Change will be 
explained “initial-request”, “first_manager_approval” 
operation and the Xacml request/response associated with 
the Operations. 
Figure 6: High Level Architecture of AW-TRBAC 
A. ROLE CHANGE URI 
The URI for the role change is as follows for the 
illustrations purpose. 
http://<profdoc.uel.ac.uk>/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolech
ange/{operation} 
The following operations are supported within role change 
request: initial-request, first-manager-approval, second-
manager-approval and close-request. The initial Role 
Change request operation for role change is as follows: 
http://<profdoc.uel.ac.uk>/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolech
ange/initial-request  
Request Parameters: Table 1 presents the initial role 
change request parameters using JSON structure including 
UserId, RoleId, TaskId and resource. The request is 
activated when the user initial a role change, These 
parameters are used by the portal to construct XACML 
request using POST method. 
TABLE I 
REQUEST OPERATION “INITIAL ROLE CHANGE REQUEST” 
Resource 
Information 
Description 
Operation Initial-request 
Request 
Body 
UserId - Unique identifier of a subject 
(user) 
RoleId- Unique identifier of a role 
Taskid- Unique identified of an IT 
workflow 
ResourceId - Unique service/object id 
Request 
format 
JSON 
Action POST  / 
awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/initial-
request 
Response :The table 2 above shows the response structure 
of a role change request using JSON format. A successful 
response will return a code of 201, otherwise a 400 for a 
bad request. The necessary parameters are taskinstanceid 
and status of the request.  
TABLE 2 
RESPONSE PARAMETERS INITIAL_REQUEST  
Resource 
Information 
Description 
Response Code HTTP/1.1 201 created 
Response error HTTP/1.1 400 bad request 
Response Body TaskInstanceid, status 
Response 
format 
JSON 
 
As shown below in Figure 7, an example of XML request 
& response in Role Change request. It contains the URI, 
operation, body of the request, action and response format. 
Request: POST 
/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolechange/initial-request http/1.1 
Host:profdoc.uel.ac.uk 
Content-type: application/json 
Content length: nnn 
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Response: HTTP/1.1 210 Created 
{"response":{"TaskInstanceid": "t001", 
"Status":"successfully created role change request"  }  } 
 
Figure 7: XML Request Change 
 
Operation: MANAGER APPROVAL URI FOR ROLE 
CHANGE 
As shown below in Table 3, the First Manager Approval 
request.  The table 3 shows the first approval request 
structure. The request body is also JSON document which 
contains the UserId, TaskId and TaskInstanceId. The 
following URI shows how the first manager approval 
process, which takes in various parameters as a JSON 
entries: 
First Manager Approval REST URI Operation: 
http://<profdoc.uel.ac.uk>/awtrbac/portal/auth/task/rolech
ange/first-approval 
TABLE 3 
REQUEST OPERATION PARAMETERS  FOR THE  “FIRST 
MANAGER APPROVAL”  
  
Resource 
information 
Description 
Operation First_approval 
Request Body UserId - Unique identifier of a subject 
(Manager) 
Taskid- Unique identified of an IT 
workflow 
TaskInstanceid – Unique identifier of 
the task instance 
Request format JSON 
VI.IMPLEMENTATION OF AW-TRBAC POC 
(PROOF OF CONCEPT) 
The PoC implementation language of choice is Java 
(Gosling, 2000) for the AW-TRBAC. It is a well-
established, mature and relatively secure language 
extensively used in the industry. It has a large range of 
open-sourced projects, technologies and frameworks 
available with large community support. Java related 
technologies such as JAXB (Fialli and Vajjhala,2003), 
JAXP (Sun Microsystem), JAX-RS (Li,2011) are used to 
develop the backbone of the framework, that includes 
processing and handling of XML (Bray and Paoli,1998), 
REST (Pautasso,2009) based APIs and interactions 
amongst the framework components. The back-end server 
is based on the largely adopted Tomcat Server. 
  
The core part of the system is the AW-TRBAC policy 
language to leverage on the latest industry standard 
XACML 3.0 (Rissanen,2010). The open source 
implementation of this standard is the Balana (Chen and 
Gasparini, 2013) by WS02. The policies within the 
XACML reliant on the requests, it contains conditional 
statement and target, which are derived from the requests to 
allow or deny resource access.  IT workflow task on the 
other hand is not solely dependent on the request values. 
This requires XACML XPath functions to operate on the 
data store. However, they restricted to content' XML from 
the request.  While it may take some values from the 
request, policies are primarily focused on the data from the 
Data stores for its assertions. To overcome this issue, this 
research introduced new function of the target to meet the 
additional requirement to provide the dynamic SoD 
instance level restriction.   Role Check Function has been 
considered for PoC demonstration as it a fundamental part 
of the AW-TRBAC model. 
 
A. ROLE CHANGE FUNCTION 
Role Check function validates Coordinator role, ensuring 
request is authorized. The target statements for this function 
(defined as an ID) are handled by this function, it matches 
against the Role store (see 1a, 1b and 1c on Fig 7 below). 
When request is received the function checks the user ID 
against the role within the user role store, if the user role 
match is “true” then it updates the Role Assigned Data store 
with the entry and response back with decision true or false. 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-check 
. 
B. STATIC & DYNAMIC SEGREGATION OF DUTIES 
CHECK (SOD) 
SoD checks function validation and enforce segregation 
between the Coordinator role and Manager role at the task 
instance level, to ensure authorised users are allowed to 
perform action upon sequence of tasks.  IT workflow task 
require static and dynamic SoD for its statements. One 
statement may generate reference IDs stored in a variable, 
which is later required/used by another statement, such a 
concept is not present in XACML. To address this issue, 
this research introduces another function: 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:sod-check 
The `instanceid' and `new' variables are declared in the 
target section of the policy. The instanceid value is 
extracted from the input request type (e.g. Subject) 
compared against the subject ID in the role assigned task 
store, to check that the submitter is not an approver and a 
new status of the task instance is stored in the role assigned 
task store (see 2a-2d in Fig 7).   For a ‘new' variable it 
creates an entry in the store for the statement, assertion (see 
3a-3b). The content is of a new variable populated and used 
by the conditional statements. 
C.STATIC & DYNAMIC BINDING OF DUTIES (BOD) 
BoD check function will enforce restriction on Coordinator 
role through validation of role check and task instance ID.  
IT workflow task requires Binding on Duties (BoD), which 
entails match ID against the instance ID in the target 
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section of policy.  To address this functionality, we have 
introduced another function: 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:bod-check 
The `instanceid' and `new' variables are declared in the 
target section of the policy. The instanceid values are 
extracted from the input request type (e.g. subject) 
compared against the subject ID in the role assigned task 
store for match and a new status of the task instance is 
stored in the role assigned task store (see 3a-3c). 
D.SINGLE TO MULTIPLE MAPPING (Role Change) 
XACML conditional statements are single value entry 
attributes, whereas IT workflow task statements are multi-
valued parameters. To map single-to-multi-values,  fourth 
function is considered: 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-check 
This function first obtains the attribute value of an XACML 
policy conditional statement (this value needs to be a 
unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role 
Policy. If a match is found, the role and its properties are 
matched against the Role Change store. If all is successful, 
it will return true, otherwise false (see 4a-4d) 
E.SINGLE TO MULTIPLE (Role Change approver 
Check) 
For the static & a dynamic change of role it requires single 
to multiple valued parameter with multiple conditional 
statement and policy enforcement to generate an outcome 
result to grant/deny. This function is the most complex 
function as it carries out two levels of approver check; one 
for existing managers in the existing department to approve 
the task role change, then the onboarding manager approval 
for the new role change. To carry out task in sequence and 
carry out SoD check, three different policies are 
incorporated in a conditional statement with variable 
parameters. To solve this issue a fifth function has been 
created. 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-approve-
check 
This function first obtains the attribute value of an XACML 
policy conditional statement (this value needs to be a 
unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role 
Policy. If a match is found, the role and its properties are 
matched against existing department business process store 
Role Change store. It then requests approver check in the 
role assigned task store and approve the request.  If all is 
successful, it will return true, otherwise false (see 5a-5g Fig 
8(b)). For a `new' variable it creates an entry in the role 
change store and the Role assigned task store for the 
statement assertion. The content is of a new variable 
populated and used by the conditional statements. 
urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-approve-
check 
The second condition of this function is to carry out 1st 
approver checks before 2nd approval. It obtains the 
attribute value of an XACML policy conditional statement 
(this value needs to be a unique ID). It uses this as an xPath 
reference to a role Policy. If a match is found, the role and 
its properties are matched against the Role Change Store 
and Business process. It then checks 1st authorisers 
instance in Role assigned Task Store, it approves the 
request.  if all successful it will return true, otherwise false 
(see 6a-6i Fig 8(b)).  For a ‘new' variable it creates/check 
for an entry and in the role change store and the Role 
assigned task store for the statement assertion. The content 
is of a new variable populated and used by the conditional 
statements. 
urn: uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-change-approve-
check 
This condition of this function is to carry out the BoD 
duties check, it obtains the attribute value of an XACML 
policy conditional statement (this value needs to be a 
unique ID). It uses this as an xPath reference to a role 
Policy. If a match is found, the role and its properties are 
matched against the subject ID in Role Assigned Task 
store, if all successful, it will return true, otherwise false 
(see 7a-7d Fig 8(b)).  For a ‘new' variable it creates/check 
for an entry in the Role assigned task store for the statement 
assertion. The content is of a new variable populated and 
used by the conditional statements. 
F.CUSTOMISED FUNCTIONS 
This section depicts Custom Functions developed for AW-
TRBAC to enable Role Change capabilities within the AW-
TRBAC model.  There are two specific functions developed 
for service change (role change) requirement, which would 
require to adapt to dynamic environment based on the rules 
and policy enforcement, to mitigate escalation of privilege 
and information disclosure risk.  To remain consistent with 
the story in the paper, Role change functions and policy 
will be described below.  
FunctionId="urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-
change-check” 
FunctionId="urn:uel:ac:uk:xacml:3.0:function:role-
change-approve-check” 
XACML Policies: This section describes the policies that 
were executed for the evaluation of the Service Change 
(role change) request and each policy has been designed to 
evaluate unique value within the XACML security request.    
xacml-change-role-policy - This policy executed to ensure 
authorised user submitted the request and the user instance 
exits.   
xacml-change-role-current-approve-policy – This policy 
provides appropriate governance within the current 
department, it verifies that the authoriser is within the 
current department and there is no conflict of interest by 
performing SoD check.xacml-change-role-new-approve-
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policy – This policy executed to provide authorisation for 
the provision of the new role 
 
 
Figure:  8 (a) - Extended XACML capability for SoD/BoD function of AW-TRBA
 
 
 
Figure: 8(b): Extended XACML Policy Engine for AWTRBAC Model (role change) 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
Proof of Concept (POC) has been experimented against the 
requirements satisfaction and applicability solution against 
the use case. Requirements were tested by simulating the 
six test cases to meet constraints and characteristics defined 
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in the Dynamic Access Control Model.  Script simulates a 
user making a security request using REST URI which 
invokes the TR-BAC system implemented as microservice 
architecture, that performs the dynamic access control.  
Access request are converted to XACML equivalent which 
is then validated through XACML policy implemented 
using the open-source Balana engine.  The engine in turn 
makes various data assertion on data store before allowing 
access to the resource (access Request system). There was a 
total of six scripts ran to test the requirements identified in 
section 4.1 and the execution of the constraints were 
recorded in a backend SQL database table 
A. REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTION 
To validate against the implemented solution has been 
conducted and associated outputs were recorded in Table 4. 
For Example UserId “Mat” has role permission “manager” 
which allows him to approve the security request submitted 
by UserID “Bob” who is the role  “coordinator” , as shown 
in row  one  of the Table 4. This satisfies the requirement of 
the “Only authorised users access the resources” and 
“second row showing SoD through role and task instance” 
through restriction on task instance ID “Tif917803b” row 
one of the table, on which the Manager Role acted upon in 
row one, this is to ensure segregation of duties are 
performed at task instance level as well as role level, which 
satisfies the requirement of “Dynamic segregation of duties 
at the Instance level”.  
The action column in row two status changed to 
“approved”, it records the role that performed the action on 
a task (security request) and resources (PC) that has been 
authorised by the role manager (Mat) on a task instance 
(Tif917803b) at a time event.  This satisfies the requirement 
of “adequate event logging and access availability in real 
time ensuring governance”, of access management process.   
Dynamic segregation of duties at instance level is also 
shown in row four,  “tf317701a” an instanceId  for a  role 
change request, submitted by role “Coordinator”, which 
shown in task column as  “Role Change”, that is approved 
by the role “manger” and new task instance recorded 
“change-rolecurrent-approve” and action status set to 
“approve,  this proves that SoD enforced at task instance Id, 
Subject and role. Also shown in row six subjects “Duncan” 
who is the second level of approver for onboarding service 
manager approves the same task instance Id.  
“tf317701a”, ensuring task contingency and sequence flow 
of tasks approval maintained and role change data store 
will be updated and existing role will no longer be active 
for the subject.  This rule of enforcement in the policy 
allows revocation of existing entitlements and provision of 
new credentials.    
Results in  Table 4 depicts that Policy engine successfully, 
enforced the task constraints for SoD, BOD and Role 
Change, Instance level restriction, event logging, ensuring 
governance and mitigating broken access control risk 
through remediation of escalation of privilege 
vulnerability though instance level restriction and 
validation through the function in policy engine, meeting 
dynamic access control requirements. 
TABLE 4: REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION EVENT LOGS. 
B.APPLICABILITY IN REAL-LIFE SOLUTION 
To measure the system performance against the use case 
and a sustainable real life solution, this research experiment 
benchmarked against similar work carried out by (Ali & 
Moreau, 2013) whereby the author extended Balana engine 
to translate the provenance-based policy language into 
XACML request.  To authors knowledge there are no 
existing experiments carried out and attempted to extend 
the Oasis standard for dynamic access control requirements.  
The system was setup to measure performance of the policy 
enforcement by recording the cumulative time for end to 
end execution of a policy, this includes policy request, 
translation and execution in a policy engine.  A total of one 
million execution recorded.  Request was executed in a 
sequence ten thousand batch and each result (contain mean 
value with error bar at 95% confidence level) were recorded 
against the two hypotheses: 
• System performance will not degrade with the dynamic 
access control request.   
• Increased conditional statement with a role change will 
affect the processing time.  
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Benchmark Environment: The experiments used to evaluate 
the performance of the framework is based on Intel (R) 
Core (TM) i7-2820QM CPU @2.30 GHZ, with 6Gb of 
RAM and 600Gb of disk space. 
Methods:  The requirements from 4.1 of the use cases were 
tested for policy evaluation generated using REST API.  
Rest client would make a query to the server which 
executes the XACML policy and responses back to rest 
client.  Experimental setup running 1m end-to-end runs in a 
batch of 10000 of a security request execution, then 
calculating the variance for simple security request against 
the complex role change request. 
C RESULTS  
As expected, results were consistent, it has taken an average 
of 0.12 (S) seconds for simple end to end security request to 
complete, with standard error of 0.024 (S) and confidence 
interval set at 95%.  This indicates despites addition of 
additional overhead on system performance did not 
degrade.  Whereas Role Change request mean value is 0.26 
(S).  Time taken to process the request with complex 
conditions is almost double. However, performance 
remains consistent during the stress test with standard 
deviation 0.039 (S) from mean remain constant with 0.039 
(S) margin error and Confidence Interval within 95% is 
0.076 (S), this indicates that if the system performance 
retested again at 95% confidence interval it will have 0.95 
probability of containing the mean 0.26 (S) and 95% of the 
access request distribution is contained in the confidence 
interval.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The research focused primarily to resolve the real-world 
problem, however the challenge was to produce a piece of 
research which would be sustainable in academia, resolve 
the industry problems and viable within the borderless 
security in the new technology era. This research was 
carried out to resolve industrial problem and provide 
sustainability for the dynamic emerging technology in a 
borderless environment through development/adoption of a 
dynamic access control model leveraging on XACML 
policy enforcement to improve overall risk posture of the 
firm. This research developed a dynamic access control 
model leveraging on Existing RBAC and ABAC access 
control model to provide the capability of task instance 
segregation coupled with role level of segregation.  Instance 
level restrictions were imposed upon tasks that are 
permissioned through role enablement for a user.  Other 
aspect which this research focuses on is the IT workflow 
ensuring the audit trail of process owner approvals though 
sequence of task being followed and enforced through role, 
task, process and task instance.  The research extended the 
OASIS standard, introducing five new functions and two 
repositories to enhance the functionality through further 
development of open source Balana Engine.  Extension 
were enhancement/gaps within current Access control 
model to enable real time decision making in a dynamic 
borderless environment such as adoption of cloud and AI 
Machine Learning Technology.   
The research also focused on mitigating the critical web 
application risk highlighted by OWASP standard, 
enhancement to the broken access control through 
policy/rule enforcement and dynamic access control model, 
incorporating Dynamic SoD and governance. Research also 
mitigates the insufficient logging and monitoring risk which 
through policy enforcement on data store through creation 
of task instance level with events and actions.  This will be 
an enabler for cutting edge IT deployment through 
enhancement of risk posture. AW-TRBAC model 
framework was able to meet the requirements for borderless 
network perimeter access control that require dynamic and 
real time decision making for resources to authorised users.  
It was noted that simple security request has taken 0.12(s) 
to process, while the complex request such as change in 
service role with additional conditional statements and 
targets doubled in time 0.26(s), this in comparison to the 
benchmark experiment by (Ali & Moreau,2013) is 
commercially viable.   
Limitations within the research to further develop the PoC 
into industrial scale solution to understand the complexity 
within the policy rules and performance, AW-TRBAC 
could be extended to support as a broker CASB (Cloud 
Access Security Broker) Acts as a gatekeeper, allowing the 
organization to extend the reach of their security policies 
beyond their own infrastructure. AW-TRBAC is effectively 
could be integrated with organisation Identity management 
solution to provide holistic view, visibility and governance. 
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